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Thomas McCarthy’s Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human 
Development is an intriguing and important book; moreover, 
despite its heavy themes and its fine scholarship, it is 
extremely readable. And it is very timely. The questions it 
takes up are some of the most pressing of our age: 
globalization, international distributive justice, and 
sustainable economic development in particular. Its central 
problematic concerns the detrimental effects of 
developmental thinking as a core feature of modernity. The 
book seeks, says McCarthy, to make “a contribution to the 
critical history of the present” (2), but it does not stop with 
critical analysis; McCarthy strives to reconstruct the concept 
of “development” in the interest of securing human rights 
and establishing global justice. 
Developmental thinking is a fundamental aspect of 
modernity, McCarthy asserts, but it is not peculiar to 
modernity; the ancients (famously, Aristotle) had explicit 
theories of development. For the ancients, however, 
development was a matter of each being fulfilling its nature 
in the course of its existence. Time itself was not progressive; 
rather, it was cyclic. Development occurred only at the level 
of the individual entity, and each entity repeated the same 
basic developmental process according to its species. It was 
Christianity that introduced the notion of the ever-new 
moment in its story of the temporal progression from 
Creation, to Fall, to Redemption, to Last Judgment (134). 
However, Christianity’s narrative was not progressive in the 
sense of improving the state of the world; the world was but a 
staging area for a progression that was purely spiritual. In 
modernity, by contrast, the notion of development is 
reconceived as material human progress, the gradual 
improvement of industry, technology, knowledge, and social 
and governmental institutions. This is the milieu in which 
Kant conceived of the inevitable social and political 
progression of history by natural means (conflicts generated 
and resolved by our natural unsocial sociability) coupled (and 
in tension) with the unpredictability of a history that is the 
domain of human freedom. McCarthy returns us to Kant’s 
work as both the beginning of a modernity whose 
developmental thinking now imperils and impoverishes 
millions and as the source of a potential rethinking of 
development toward global justice for all. 
Given space constraints, I must condense McCarthy’s 
reasoning, but basically it is this: (1) Developmental thinking, 
like development itself, is a fact. For a variety of reasons, we 
cannot simply abandon it and think otherwise. As McCarthy 
puts it toward the end of the book, “developmental thinking 
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is irrepressible…” (242). That being the case, (2) we must 
confront developmental thinking as it has played out in our 
history and work through the damage it has done, the 
injustice, the violence, and in particular the racism that it has 
generated and furthered, and that it has used to further itself. 
If we do not do so, those elements will continue to structure 
our world, with all their damaging effects, into the future. (3) 
Embracing development, without its racism and imperialism, 
etc., and without the supposition of religious or metaphysical 
guarantees of success, requires hope for a better future, one in 
which global justice reigns and human misery is truly 
minimized. But such hope is hard to come by these days, 
especially after all the atrocities that have been committed in 
the name of human betterment and emancipation. Where will 
we get it? (4) We will not get it through some grand totalizing 
theory of history. As Kant said, history cannot be thought in 
its totality through speculative reason, precisely because it is 
a domain of freedom. Our hope lies, rather, in reflective 
judgment informed by empirical observation and guided by 
practical concern. But we may indeed hope, McCarthy insists, 
and in fact it is morally imperative that we do so. 
I am very sympathetic with McCarthy’s concerns. I believe his 
location of much of the modern world’s ills in our persistent 
belief in progressive development on a global scale is apt, and 
I am impressed with his range of historical knowledge on the 
subject. Developmental thinking needs forceful philosophical 
critique, and I am grateful that someone with McCarthy’s 
erudition and sensitivity has undertaken the project. It is, 
however, an enormous project, and McCarthy’s treatment of 
it is unlikely to answer all the questions and allay all the 
concerns that we might have. In the remaining space allotted 
to me, I want to raise some of those concerns and questions in 
the hope that McCarthy and his readers will take them up in 
future work. (Nothing I say below should be taken to 
diminish the accomplishments of the book as it stands.) 
First, is it the case that development and developmental 
thinking are facts? McCarthy is careful to qualify any appeal 
to factuality with a clear account of facts as products of 
interpretation. Hence, by “fact” I take him to mean simply 
that developmental thinking in one form or another is 
pervasive in the history of our society (insofar as we know 
that history) and is, for that and many other reasons, 
inescapable for us for the foreseeable future. There is no 
thinking otherwise at this juncture. And thus it is also 
inescapable that we perceive development and 
developmental thinking in the work and actions of our 
predecessors. 
From a Foucauldian perspective, I agree with this view, 
although probably not for the reasons that McCarthy holds it 
(if, indeed, he does). Development is a fundamental feature of 
modernity, and we are products of it. As products of 
disciplinary institutions and practices, we are developmental 
through and through. Foucault never argued that we could 
cease to be developmental subjects, only that we could resist 
developmental normalization by striving to decouple 
discipline’s cultivation of capacities from its intensification of 
docility. Disciplined development can intensify resistance to 
domination; it can decrease docility. On this point, I believe 
McCarthy and Foucault are fellow travelers. At some points 
in the text, however, McCarthy veers uncomfortably close to 
making ontological claims about development and to 
conflating a variety of fairly different processes under that 
one term (see chapter 7, esp. section V). I do not think the 
only alternative to progressive development is sheer, 
atemporal difference. Whether our example is the growth and 
decay of a living entity, the “advance” of science, or the 
complexification of a social system, we observe changes that, 
while not merely random across time, also need not be 
characterized at the outset as “progress.” Temporality can be 
unidirectional and irreversible (thus, change is not mere 
differing) without being thereby progressive in any but the 
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barest sense of the term. It is important, historically and 
politically, to be careful to keep even small distinctions in the 
meaning of “development” in different contexts in mind. 
Otherwise analysis becomes normative much too 
prematurely. Development and developmental thinking may 
be facts, but they are most likely an array of facts in a variety 
of historically emerging deployments. 
Second, I want to affirm McCarthy’s claim that racism is an 
inherent, not an incidental, characteristic of modernity and 
that, therefore, it must be worked through rather than simply 
disavowed. Despite the legal gains that minorities have made 
in the US over the last fifty or sixty years, despite the 
decolonization of much of the world, and despite the fact that 
most white people do not actively and explicitly embrace 
racist doctrines anymore, racism persists in entrenched 
practices and institutions and, as McCarthy makes 
abundantly clear, in the very way we think. A century ago, 
racism was upheld by biological theory and “fact.” That is no 
longer so; modern genetics does not support the division of 
humanity into distinct races (5). However, because race was 
never simply a biology concept, and, because the 
developmental aspects of biological racism can easily be 
shifted onto concepts like “cultural development” (as well as 
“cultural pathology”), many of the very same assumptions 
about many of the very same groups of people can be and are 
routinely made. African Americans are no longer considered 
to be incapable of stable family life and democratic self-
government because they are Negroes; rather, their culture(s) 
are not sufficiently developed to support psychological 
maturation and independence (12). McCarthy calls this 
phenomenon “neoracism,” and he argues that it undergirds a 
“neoimperialism” characteristic of US foreign and military 
policy, as well as the practices of other Western powers and 
their conjoint institutions, such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade 
Organization. If we fail to acknowledge how deeply racism is 
embedded in our conception of the world as developmental—
and in particular as economically and technologically 
developmental—we will perpetuate terrible injustice. We 
must confront our own histories, face the injustices that our 
predecessors’ actions and our current institutions inflict, 
and—difficult though it will be—strip our developmental 
thinking of these dangerous and deeply injurious aspects. 
But, as already noted, McCarthy declares that we must not 
give up on developmental thinking altogether. Instead we 
“should construct a critical theory of development, at a higher 
level of reflexivity, which takes into account and tries to avoid 
historical distortions and misuses of developmental thinking” 
(242). My concern is that, even with disaggregation of 
“various domains, processes, strands, and logics of 
development” and with acceptance of “a multiplicity of 
hybrid forms of modernization” (242), degree of development 
will still correlate with degree of worth. As long as 
development is valued, I suspect, this will be true. And 
whatever is not deemed well- or highly-developed will be 
disvalued, shunned, or targeted for elimination. Modernity 
itself is conceived as a developmental stage, is it not? As such 
it is supposedly better than whatever preceded it. This is why 
we moderns tend to believe that all the world must 
modernize, even if we accept that different regions may 
become and then be modern in different ways. While I agree 
with McCarthy that there is “pressing need for organized 
collective action on behalf of the poorest and most vulnerable 
societies” (226), I am not persuaded that we must think in 
terms of developing those societies (or helping them to 
develop) as we organize our response to their needs. Such 
societies have a multiplicity of needs, but it is not obvious 
that among those needs there is always a need for something 
accurately labeled “development.” We must be cautious in 
our presumptions; it will not do to widen or pluralize the 
concept of “development” or “modernity” to encompass all 
the economic or political needs that such societies evince. 
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Finally, is it true that in order to work toward global justice 
we must have hope that global justice can be achieved? I 
appreciate the note of pragmatism sounded here; certainly no 
one wants to commit themselves to a cause clearly lost from 
the outset. However, I do not believe that people generally 
approach moral questions in speculative terms—that is, 
regardless of the current rational-choice-theoretic craze in 
economic and ethical theory, I think what moves most people 
to moral action is the draw of another’s need, not a 
calculation about the likelihood of ultimate success.  
Every few months, I give money to an organization in South 
Dakota that provides food and clothing to people living on 
the Sioux reservations there. I have no illusion that my gifts 
make up for four hundred years of imperialism and genocide 
perpetrated against Native American peoples. Furthermore, I 
know that many of the people fed this month will be hungry 
next month, and those who get clothing this winter will next 
winter once again be cold. It would be wonderful if I could 
change the world, right the old wrongs and create a future 
that would be better than today. But even if I cannot do that, I 
will still help. It is not because I hope for a more just future; it 
is because I know that right now there are people who are 
hungry and people who are cold. Hope is not a prerequisite 
for giving. 
Whenever possible, I want to do things to bring about a more 
just future. But even if I knew for sure that a more just future 
was impossible, I would not stop responding to the needs of 
those around me, including long-term needs for secure 
infrastructure, meaningful work, and political liberty. I would 
not stop fighting against bullies and bigots, big and small. I 
would not stop trying to alleviate suffering. I would not stop 
listening and caring. To do so would be to stop living.  
Of course, a more just future is possible, even if the possibility 
of a persistent state of global justice is remote. It is not 
morally imperative for people to hope for any such future, 
however; if anything is morally imperative, it is courage, 
along with a bone-deep, non-logical and non-metaphysical 
belief in human equality. 
 
